Since the end of the Cold War the international order has been disrupted. No longer are there two opposing super powers managing the world in a tightly-framed construct of Communism versus Democracy. Rather, today's international order is more complex, characterized by emerging powers, the rebalancing of power, emerging economic powerhouses, non-state actors and transnational phenomena. Since 11 September 2001, the enemy of the Unites States has been difficult to identify and categorize, and hard to predict; it does not call forward a regular order of battle. In its "War on Terror" the United States has faced an amorphous enemy. As the War on Terror winds down after the death of Osama Bin Ladin, the nation seems to be seeking the clarity of a more traditional enemy -one that fits the paradigm of a "stable" bipolar order.
1 That enemy appears to be China. It is difficult to pick up a foreign relations journal, military journal, a newspaper or an economic journal without reading about
China as a potential threat to the United States. As a large state with a rapidly growing economy, China is a natural rival. But must China necessarily be an enemy of the United States? Are we helping to turn China into our next nemesis? A study in international relations theory sheds light on this issue.
In the realm of international theory, "realists" focus mainly on national power, relying on the military to protect and preserve national interests. Simultaneously, neoliberals focus on constitutional behavior -and the ability of international institutions to mediate international disputes and maintain international order. By contrast, a constructivist perspective says that we construct the environment that we live in. "We make the world what it is by interacting with each other and saying what we say to each other." 2 In constructivist theory this is applied not only at the individual level but at the state level as well. Applying the constructivist perspective to international relations theory can clearly show us how the Unites States is "constructing" a future world in which China is our primary enemy. Before exploring this further one must understand constructivism as it is applied in international relations theory.
Definition of Constructivism
When considering constructivism as an international relations theory it should be understood that constructivism describes international politics as "socially constructed"
phenomena. 3 It draws its roots from numerous social theories to include critical theory, postmodernism, feminist theory, historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, symbolic interactionism and structuration theory. 4 One of the fathers of constructivist theory is Alexander Wendt. Wendt posits that there are two basic tenants of constructivism: "1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces; and 2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature." 5 Given that shared ideas are the impetus behind Wendt's notion of constructivism, one can see that ideas form those very interests that states compete for in the world.
Wendt says that "ideas constitute power and interest in the first place." 6 The critical tie here is that ideas are shared an interpreted by numerous actors. Jordan. 29 Eden believed that Nassar influenced Glubb's removal from this position.
From this point onward, Eden's language began to change toward Nassar. He claimed that "he is our enemy and shall be treated as such. The United States National Security Strategy of May 2010 identifies our security concerns and our ends and ways to address those concerns. 33 To identify and characterize a country in our National Security Strategy is a speech act that surely could put another state on edge depending on how that state interprets the reference. Being identified as a possible security threat to the United States can be intimidating and can cause negative interpretations or consequences of that speech act. China is mentioned ten times and inferred numerous times in the 2010 National Security Strategy. Our National Security Strategy says that "power in an interconnected world is no longer a zero sum game." 34 Our National Security Strategy also enforces the constructivist concept of rules, stating that "rules of the road must be followed, and there must be consequences for those nations that break the rules -whether they are nonproliferation obligations, trade agreements, or human rights conditions." 35 This statement makes an implicit reference to China since it has long been considered by the United States as a violator or human rights. China's interpretation of this speech act regarding rules could be a negative one, ultimately increasing tension in future interactions.
Additionally, the National Security Strategy states that "we will not seek to impose our values through force. Instead, we are working to strengthen international norms on behalf of human rights, while welcoming all peaceful democratic movements." 36 Again, China as a Communist state, could interpret this message as a threat to its national interest. The National Security Strategy addresses cyberspace,
saying that "the threats we face range from individual criminal hackers to organic criminal groups, from terrorist networks to advanced nation states." 37 In this case, while
China is not identified directly, it could infer that "advanced nation states" is directed toward them as the United States has identified them as a major cyber threat in the last decade.
One of the growing topics of concern mentioned in numerous sources today is the build-up of China's military capacity. This concern is also addressed in the National Security Strategy: "we will strengthen our regional deterrence postures in order to make certain that regional adversaries gain no advantages from their acquisition of new, offensive military capabilities." 38 An even a stronger statement follows: "we will monitor
China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that United
States interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected." 39 Even as the United States may strive to assure its allies, it further alarms China.The National Security Strategy could be interpreted by China as implying that they have made poor choices in the past. The document states "we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises." 40 And the National Security Strategy discusses how "we must encourage continued reduction in tension between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan," 41 yet another sensitive subject that could spark negative power talk and speech acts that further alienate China from the United States.
While the National Security Strategy addresses a broad scheme of threats and security issues, it focuses on international norms, rules, values and national interest. In contrast to Biden, the President is more careful in his speech. While he tends to communicate certain warnings to China, he usually balances these with positive remarks. But, while this balancing act may keep the peace, short term, it also leads to incoherent or conflicting speech acts. Recently, during a trip in November 2011 to the Pacific region, the President stated, "as we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region.
We will preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace…..The United States is a Pacific Power, and we are here to stay." 61 The President continued to push tensions by expounding on what constructivist theorists call rules and norms.
According to author George Condon, "his main message to China is that they need to start playing by the rules in their dealings with other countries, whether in the South China Sea or in the valuation of China's currency." 62 China's response to the President's and Secretary Clinton's messages was less than positive; the Chinese indicated that "they would only affect the atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust, damaging a hard-won setting of healthy development in the region and that China was merely a scapegoat for U.S. financial problems." 68 Thus, it is clear that while we may try to reinforce positive behavior and international norms, our speech acts can have a negative influence that further exacerbate tension that could erupt in the future.
Other influential leaders also have key roles in constructing China as an enemy.
For example, some GOP presidential candidates hold very strong feelings about China -views which they have communicated during Presidential candidate debates. In debates held in November of 2011, China was mentioned as a competitor, and a threat.
What these candidates say is telling and has potential to create further friction. For example, candidate Mitt Romney promised that "if elected president", he would "issue an executive order to sanction China for unfair trade practices." 69 Romney unavoidably escalated tension as he claimed that "his policy toward China would include arming Taiwan to the hilt." 70 As he panders to an extremely conservative element of the Republican party, he helps unsettle United States -China relations.
Other candidates have jumped on the "get tough with China" bandwagon, including former Senator Rick Santorum, who said "I want to go to war with China." Americans simply are not comfortable with a growing and influential Communist China.
In July 2011 "John Birch Society members passed out literature and held up signs on the sidewalk in front of the National Governors Association Conference opposing new coziness with Communist China." 87 As we decipher whether the United States is helping to construct a future environment of high tension with China, we must remember that our speech acts highlighting Chinese "violation" of norms, as we interpret them, might only exacerbate the problem and alienate China further. According to TIME Magazine's Michael
Schuman, "Simplistic sloganeering that goes on in the United States about China only intensifies those problems and makes them harder to resolve." 88 Understanding constructivism in an international theory context, and understanding that speech acts create rules and norms about how actors view issues, sets the foundation for understanding that the United States is helping to make an enemy out of China. Our numerous defense policy documents, combined with speech acts generated by our nation's senior leaders, only fuel the negative image of China among the American people. This process becomes self-feeding and self-perpetuating.
Interpretation of these speech acts and ideas is not a one sided event. While the United
States domestic population interprets ideas about China, Chinese leadership and the Chinese people are doing the same. Constructivist theory predicts that when two sides continuously refer to one another in hostile and wary terms, they will "construct" a scenario in which they become enemies. The United States arguably has painted China as an enemy and security threat while at the same time identifying it as an economic competitor on the world stage. Actions by the United States decision-makers, and speech acts by United States leaders, are creating an environment of increasing hostility and mistrust. As we survey documents, speeches, and media, we can see that the constructivists may well be right. We may be "constructing" our enemy of the future.
The Future
As we move into the future, and as we try to reassure our allies about China, we may end up making China feel paranoid and encircled. If we acknowledge this situation now, then we can take necessary steps to prevent further tension. One way to accomplish this is to tone this down the administration's rhetoric toward China.
President Obama seems to be attempting to implement this strategy, much to the distaste of many political, community and business leaders. While tempered rhetoric is only a partial solution, it is better than ignoring the problem altogether. I believe that we ought to continually and explicitly acknowledge this dilemma -making clear to the Chinese that reassurance of allies ought not to translate directly (in their minds) into aggressive rhetoric. In order to tone down the rhetoric we must be cognizant of what we say, and realize that even as we speak to our domestic population and our allies, we build tension with the Chinese. It is very hard to control the public press and public leaders; all one can do is to have public officials set the appropriate tone, and thus try to set an example for others to follow. After all, official voices are the most important ones when communicating strategic issues.
The fact that we are self-focused intensifies the problem. In today's globalized world, we as a nation must work harder to see and hear the world through the eyes and ears of others. It is imperative that we understand and are aware of Chinese culture and history. Chinese culture and history feeds its grand strategy of "strategic defense utilizing conventional and unconventional diplomatic and military means in a geographic orientation and protracted manner." 89 It is possible to work compatibly with this strategy using Secretary of State Clinton's concept of "Smart Power", which uses "new tools and techniques available for diplomacy and development to build more-durable coalitions and networks." 90 Part of the "Smart Power" approach should include United States policy makers' understanding of "the war of resistance strategy, and be able to develop their own unified strategy, one that encourages China to benefit from a stable world order and encourages it to play a constructive role." 91 The time has passed when browbeating China with our demands is likely to yield successful results. Indeed, now that
China is a global power in its own right, this approach may do more harm than good in the long run. China is still sensitive to its past -a legacy of Western intrusion and
